CWIHP Bulletin nr 3

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p. 1, in Country File, Czechoslovakia, Czech Crisis 8/
with the Americans. Mao s response was non-
materials have been drawn largely from the media of
68, State Situation Reports, Box 182, LBJPL; U.S.
committal on both issues. Khrushchev s subse-
those countries for over 40 years and are indexed in both
Department of State, Czech Task Force, Situation
subject files and biographical files. The Institute's quent visit to Washington raised Beijing s suspi-
Report 1200 Hours EDT (SECRET), 29 August 1968,
Russian and Polish samizdat collection is one of the
p. 1, in Country File, Czechoslovakia, Czech Crisis 8/ cions of a Soviet-American rapprochement over
world's largest and there is also a Western press Archive
68, State Situation Reports, Box 182, LBJPL; U.S.
the heads of the Chinese leaders. Within the
with over seven million indexed newspaper clippings
Department of State, Czech Task Force, Situation
CCP, Mao and his comrades voiced their oppo-
dating from 1950. The files contain millions of files
Report 0600 Hours EDT (SECRET), 29 August 1968,
sition to improved relations between the Blocs,
directly and indirectly relevant to Cold War istory.
p. 2, in Country File, Czechoslovakia, Czech Crisis 8/
and the Chinese press launched a series of at-
The Institute's Analytical Research Department is
68, State Situation Reports, Box 182, LBJPL; U.S.
tacks on U.S. foreign policy in the wake of
staffed by experts on the region who produce several
Department of State, Czech Task Force, Situation
Khrushchev s visit.
publications, including the RFE/RL Daily Report and
Report, 0800 Hours EDT (SECRET), 11 September
the RFE/RL Research Report. Visitors to the Institute In his conversation with Antonov, Mao at-
1968, p. 1, in Country File, Czechoslovakia, Czech
are welcome both to utilize its information resources
Crisis 8/68, State Situation Reports, Box 182, LBJPL. tempts to lessen the impact of China s displea-
and to meet with its analysts. In addition, the Informa-
For recent Soviet documentation bearing on the matter,
sure with Soviet policies. He tries hard to show
tion Resources Department will respond to quick-refer-
see Zapis besedy s General nym sekretarem TsK
his agreement with Moscow on every issue the
ence questions received by mail, telefax, telephone, or
RKP Nikolae Chaushesku, 23 avgusta 1968 goda,
United States, Taiwan, India, Tibet, disarma-
electronic mail. Enquiries can be directed to: RFE/RL
Cable No. 847 (SECRET) from A. V. Basov, Soviet
ment. It is unlikely, however, that his reassur-
Research Institute, Coordinator of External Relations,
ambassador in Romania, to the CPSU Secretariat, 25
ances carried much weight in Moscow because of
Oettingenstr. 67, D-80000 Munich 22, Germany. Tele-
August 1968, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 6, D. 339, Ll. 47-53;
phone: (89)2102-3204; Telefax: (89)2109-2539; Elec- what the Soviets knew about the CCP s internal
Zapis besedy s poslom SFRYu v Bukhareste Ya.
tronic mail: rferl@carat.arizona.edu (Internet). positions. On the contrary, Mao may have stimu-
Petrichem, 2 sentyabrya 1968 goda, Cable No. 917
56 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
DOCUMENTATION
lated Khrushchev s suspicions of China s trust- international situation. Mao Tse-Tung expressed of the Soviet Union, which over 22 years [1918-
worthiness as an ally. extreme approval of the Soviet government pro- 1940--ed.] did not take military measures to re-
Other points worth noting in the conversa- posal for general and complete disarmament which turn the Baltic states to the ranks of the USSR.
tion are Mao s views on conflicts within the N.S. Khrushchev made during his voyage to the However, while not starting a war over Taiwan,
capitalist camp, his forthright description of the USA, and which was submitted for review to the we will always say and pronounce, that Taiwan is
strength of Tibetan nationalism, and his amazing United Nations. The proposal of the Soviet gov- an inalienable part of the Chinese People s Re-
ability to imagine a global picture of alliances ernment for full disarmament, said Mao Tse- public.
and conflicts which few other contemporary lead- Tung, really is the best means of resolving the
In 1958, continued Mao Tse-Tung, the Chi-
ers would recognize. Introduction by Odd Arne entire problem of disarmament. Precisely general
nese People s Republic, as is well known, shelled
Westad, Norwegian Nobel Institute, Oslo; trans- and complete disarmament is necessary, he un- the coastal islands in the Straits of Taiwan. This
lation by Mark H. Doctoroff, Harriman Institute, derlined. At the present time, he said further, the
was after the Americans fell into a difficult situ-
Columbia University. Peoples Liberation Army of China counts in its
ation in the Middle East. In last year s situation,
ranks approximately 2 million people. The inter- added Mao Tse-Tung, this step proved useful by
* * * * * * nal needs of the Chinese People s Republic [CPR]
adding to the American difficulties. Mao Tse-
do not require an army of such size. Control over
Tung said further, that the Chiangkaishisti [Na-
From the journal of the internal situation in the country can be entirely
tionalist Chinese] themselves wanted and had
ANTONOV, S.F. Top Secret, Copy 3 realized by the people s militia, which consists
requested that such a shelling be conducted. It is
21 October 1959 not of military personnel but of people working in
true, that during the first days after the shelling
industry. In the event that the matter leads to the
had begun Chiang-Kai Shek experienced some
Summary of a conversation real achievement of general disarmament, the size
doubts regarding the fact that the CPR might
with the Chairman of the CC CPC of the army could definitely be reduced. If the
intend to occupy the islands of Quemoy and
[Central Committee Communist Party of Americans set out to reduce the size of their own
Matsu as a result of the shelling, however, Chiang-
China] Mao-Tse Tung army, continued Mao Tse-Tung, then we defi- Kai Shek soon, in the words of Mao Tse-Tung,
on 14 October 1959 nitely could take corresponding steps to reduce
became convinced that the government of the
our own armed forces.
CPR had no such intentions. The same was true
In accordance with instructions I visited Mao Tse-Tung said further that a session of
regarding the Americans, continued Mao Tse-
Mao Tse-Tung and gave him confidential infor- the Permanent Committee of the All-China Coun- Tung; for two weeks they thought that the PLAC
mation about Comrade N.S. Khrushchev s visit cil of People s Representatives was set for Octo- (People s Liberation Army of China) intended to
to the USA. Handing Mao Tse-Tung the text of ber 14, at which would be accepted a resolution of
conquer the islands, but then they understood that
the information, I told him that according to the approval and support for the Soviet proposal for
this was not included in the plans of the govern-
Chinese press and to comments of Chinese com- general and complete disarmament. In this way,
ment of the CPR.
rades, the conviction had developed at the Em- he added, the Soviet proposal will be supported by
Mao Tse-Tung further emphasized, that the
bassy that our Chinese friends approve of the our Chinese parliament.
Chinese friends began from the fact the USA
results of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev s visit to I told Mao Tse-Tung that the debate and
would not begin a war over the coastal islands.
the USA. Comrade Mao Tse-Tung, in reply, said approval of the Soviet proposals on disarmament
Besides that, he added, last year s shelling of the
that they fully approve of this foreign policy step by the Permanent Committee of the ACCP is a
islands was undertaken when certain concrete
of the CPSU, and that they have no differences in very important and useful measure by our Chi- conditions prevailed. At the present time, noted [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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