Joly Maurice, Dialogue In Hell Between Machiavelli And Montesquieu

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period of the Empire. For the moment, this question does not preoccupy me; I simply wanted to say to
you that the Senate that I conceive must (alongside the prince) fulfill a political role that would be
analogous to the role played by the Roman Senate in the aftermath of the fall of the Republic.
Montesquieu: So. But at that time, the laws were not voted upon by the popular associations; this was
done with the aid of the senatusconsult. Is this what you would want?
Machiavelli: No: this would not be in conformity with the modern principles of constitutional rights.
Montesquieu: What thanks should one give you for such a scruple?
Machiavelli: I would have no need for this to decree what appears necessary to me. No legislative
arrangement -- as you know -- can be proposed, except if it comes from me, and my decrees have the
force of law.
Montesquieu: It is true, you had forgotten to mention this point, which is not minor; but then I do not
see to what ends you would reserve the Senate.
Machiavelli: Placed at the highest constitutional sphere, its direct intervention would only take place
during solemn circumstances: for example, if it were necessary to engage in a fundamental covenant or
if the sovereignty was in peril.
Montesquieu: This language is still very divinatory. You love to prepare your effects.
Machiavelli: Until now, the fixed idea of your modern constituents was to anticipate everything, to rule
everything according to the charters that they gave to the people. I would not make such a mistake; I
would not want to shut myself into an impenetrable circle; I would only fix things that are impossible
to leave uncertain; I would leave a wide enough margin for change so that, in great crises, there would
be other means of salvation than the disastrous expedient of revolution.
Montesquieu: You speak wisely.
Machiavelli: And, concerning the Senate, I would inscribe in my constitution: "That the Senate,
through a senatusconsult, rules upon everything that has not been anticipated by the constitution and
that is necessary for its progress; that it fixes the meaning of the articles of the constitution that might
give rise to different interpretations; that it supports or annuls all the acts that are referred to it as
unconstitutional by the government or denounced by petitions lodged by the citizens; that it can
propose the bases for projected laws that have great national interest; that it can propose modifications
in the constitution that will be handed down by a senatusconsult."
Montesquieu: All this is very good, and such a senate would truly be a Roman Senate. I will only
make a few remarks about your constitution: it would be drafted in very vague and ambiguous terms
because you have judged, in advance, that the articles that it contains would be susceptible to different
interpretations.
Machiavelli: No, it will be necessary to anticipate everything.
Montesquieu: I would have believed that your principle in such matters would have been to avoid
anticipating and regulating everything.
Machiavelli: The illustrious President has not haunted the Palace of Themis without profit, nor
uselessly worn the round judicial cap. My words have not had any other import than this: it is necessary
to anticipate what is essential.
Montesquieu: Tell me, I beg you: your Senate, the interpreter and guardian of the fundamental pact:
does it have a proper power?
Machiavelli: Indubitably, no.
Montesquieu: Everything that the Senate does, you would be the one doing it?
Machiavelli: I am not saying the contrary to you.
Montesquieu: Whatever it interprets, you would be the one interpreting; whatever it modifies, you
would be the one modifying; whatever it annuls, you would be the one annulling?
Machiavelli: I do not deny it.
Montesquieu: Thus, you would reserve for yourself the right to undo what you have done, to take back
what you have given, to change your constitution, be it good or bad, or even to make it disappear
completely if you judge this to be necessary. I am not prejudging your intentions or your motivations,
which might make you act in this or that given circumstance; I only ask you where would the weakest
guarantee for the citizens be found in the midst of such a vast arbitrariness, and especially how could [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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